Jonathan Thomas (00:12) Welcome to the Anglotopia podcast, where we explore the pivotal moments that have shaped British and American history. This week, we're going to do something a little different and explore the history around the period with when American and British history began to diverge. I'm your host, Jonathan Thomas. And today we're joined by John Maass author of From Trenton to Yorktown, the five decisive turning points of the American Revolution and this groundbreaking new book. John Maass challenges some long held assumptions about which battles and campaigns truly altered the trajectory of the Revolutionary War. We'll explore why the events like Guilford Courthouse proved more consequential than traditional celebrated victories and examine how logistics and geography shaped military outcomes during the Revolutionary War and discuss the crucial role of the French Alliance. His detailed analysis offers fresh insights into how these five key moments from Washington's desperate gamble at Trenton to the climactic victory at Yorktown ultimately secured American independence. Welcome John. John Maass (01:12) Thank you for having me. I really appreciate it. Glad to be here. Jonathan Thomas (01:14) Thank you for being on the podcast. Now this, this is a, this is a bit new for us. don't, we don't do much American history on the podcast, but this is, this is our shared history. And this is where, you know, this is the point where British and American history starts to diverge. And a lot of people forget that before the revolution, had 250 years of British history that was shared. So I thought this would be fun to kind of, uh, introduce some American history into the podcast. Now you currently work. John Maass (01:24) Yep. Jonathan Thomas (01:42) at the National Army Museum. Can you tell us how you ended up there and what you work on and what you research? John Maass (01:48) Sure. After I got my PhD in early American military history at the Ohio State University, I was searching for academic and also government history jobs. And I applied and got a job at the US Army Center of Military History. And that is in downtown DC. I worked there for 10 years. And during that time, the National Museum of the US Army, which is at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, that was in the final planning stages and just started to break ground. And I made some inquiries and was able to transfer to the National Army Museum where I've been since 2017. I am in the Programs and Education Division. So what I work on is basically adult. So our author talks, we do a monthly battle brief that I give a talk on battles and campaigns of army history. We also plan one major symposium per year. This year it's coming up May 30th, about the first two years of the Revolutionary War. I must add also, all of our programs are free and I believe 100 % of them do have a virtual component to them. So even if folks are scattered here and there, if they want to see an author talk or a program, they can always come in virtually. And so that's what I mostly work on. I also help the exhibits team with new rotating exhibits as far as reviewing exhibit panels and scripts and things like that. So it's a very job, which I very much enjoy. Jonathan Thomas (03:39) Sounds like a really cool job. And we'll put a link in the show notes for everybody for their programs and stuff so you can check it out. I'm happy to hear there's a virtual component because some of the stuff really interests me. So your latest book, how did it come about? What inspired the book and how did you get started with it? John Maass (03:50) Yeah. Well, I'd like to say divine revelation, but it's a little bit easier than that. My other books are mostly monographs. And for those who are unfamiliar with that term, it's kind of an academic term for a book or some kind of study that is narrowly focused on one subject or one person or one aspect of history. So for example, I have a book about the Battle of Guilford Courthouse. That's a monograph about just that battle and the campaign around it. But I wanted to do something bigger. I wanted to do something more interpretive. I've been between graduate school and my own readings and visiting many, many, many Revolutionary War related sites, particularly in the South and the Mid-Atlantic. I wanted to do something interpretive. that kind of pulled together a lot of existing scholarship and even popular books that have been written by very, very good authors. And that kind of put my spin on things and was, I intended it to be provocative in that I wanted to literally provoke discussion and hear from other people, whether they agree with me or not. And so I decided in looking one, well, over several days and looking at my own personal Revolutionary War book collection in my study, which is probably, I'm going to guess probably 300, 350 books. I just started looking at the titles and they were all organized. All my books were organized by chronology of when the events happened and then a separate separate section on biographies and what have you. And I just thought, well, of all these battles and events, encampments, campaigns, seizures, which ones were the most important? so I came up with my five and I polled my historian friends, both in the Army history program outside, people I didn't know, I also asked for help from and Thought about it long time and worked out a draft and kicked it around again some more with people I regarded as experts and finally settled on a thesis and a group of five events and went from there with an agent to a publisher, Osprey Publishing, which I'll put in a plug for them where... incredibly easy to work with, very cordial, very cooperative and creative. So it's been a really great process. Jonathan Thomas (06:48) And I was remiss. didn't hold up the book while I was introducing it. Here is the finished book with the beautiful cover and everything. So yeah, it's well-done book. Osprey does, they do great work. We get most of their British related books. they're... John Maass (06:52) that's okay. Mm-hmm. Well, since you mentioned the cover, I'll give a short story. The Osprey folks sent me about five or six different covers they worked up and asked me which are the ones I liked and why and what have you. several folks that I consulted to were leaning toward a different cover. But the one that's on the book now, I have a niece who is about ready to graduate. Jonathan Thomas (07:07) Yeah. John Maass (07:28) college with an art degree and I sent it to her and It turns out she wound up kicking her kicking it around about four or five of her friends that were also in the art program And they came up with this They liked the the cover that's on the book now and they gave me about three or four really detailed bullet points as to why that should be the cover which as not as an artist I didn't know why it should be the cover I just knew I liked it and so I sent those bullet points in a a message to the folks at Osprey And they said, yep, that's the one, sounds good. So my niece is listed in the acknowledgements of the book for her contribution. She's very happy. Jonathan Thomas (07:59) Ha ha ha ha. Very nice cover. So in your book, your main argument is that there are five key turning points in the Revolutionary War that change the trajectory. And we're going to go through some of the specific events later on, but why did you select these specific events over others that are often cited as the big blockbuster crucial moments in the war? John Maass (08:17) Mm-hmm. That is the number one question I get when anybody asks me about the book. So that's a great one to start with, by the way. That's perfect. First of all, let me define turning points the way I use it so folks can know what I'm talking about. And I'll read one sentence from the book. That's the only thing I'll read from the book, so don't get scared. here's how I define turning points. Turning points refer to battles, campaigns, seizures, Jonathan Thomas (08:36) Hahaha Okay. John Maass (09:00) and other military events that are decisive and result in significant change that alters the trajectory of the conflict toward the war's outcome. So to boil that down even further, I was looking for events that had a significant impact toward the outcome of the war. Well, other events, battles, campaigns, have you, marches... can be very important and crucial to how things turned out. If they didn't lead directly to the American victory, then I did not consider them to be the decisive turning points. And we can go into examples later whenever you want to, but I... I really just wanted to focus on massive shifts in the trajectory of how the war was going. And perhaps maybe if we reverse engineer that, I guess we could say also, these are events where if they had not occurred, victory wouldn't have happened. That's another way of saying Jonathan Thomas (10:18) Okay, yeah, that sounds like an interesting way to approach it. so now moving on to some of the things you talk about. The battles of Trenton and Princeton were, are sometimes viewed as minor victories given that the small numbers involved. Why do you consider them to be among the most difficult turning points? John Maass (10:37) You're correct. The number of the garrison at Trenton of Hessians that Washington attacked and captured, all of them, was only about thousand men. And at Princeton, British contingent there that Washington and his army defeated January 3rd, 1777 was larger than that, but not a whole lot larger. So you're definitely correct there. You have to measure these two battles. actually, there was actually three battles. There was a second battle of Trenton squeezed in there the day before Princeton. And it's usually not covered other than as some kind of rear guard or skirmish before Princeton, but it actually had a very significant result. those three actions, they created a big change, which is what I was looking for. And you have to look at that in the context of when that happened. So this is on December 26th, 76th, Trenton, January 2nd, 77, 2nd Trenton, and Princeton January 3rd. When Washington decided a few days before Christmas that he was going to across the Delaware River with his army, coordinate with Pennsylvania and New Jersey militia operating near him, and attack that garrison. He was arguably at the lowest point in the war, professionally himself, but also militarily. Going back to the summer of 76, Washington fought the British in a series of battles. on Long Island, Manhattan, just off Manhattan in New Jersey near the Palisades. He was defeated at Long Island. He was defeated at Kipps Bay, at Harlem Heights, at White Plains. He had to leave across the Hudson River, at Garrison, Fort Washington in New York, Manhattan Island. Had to surrender to the British for 2,700 Continentals. Then by November 20th, he had to evacuate their position at Fort Lee, New Jersey overlooking Manhattan and began a march that was all across Northern New Jersey, including passing through Princeton, getting to Trenton and crossing the Delaware into Pennsylvania. Between the Battle of Long Island, in August of 76 and by the time he got to Pennsylvania in early December 76, his army went from roughly, and these are rough numbers, roughly 20,000 men to about 2,000 to 2,500 men. His army evaporated as they went across New Jersey. He had to retreat all the way across there, couldn't face the British because he was too weak. He knew by much earlier than December, but if we stick with December, the army's in their camps. About half of his Continentals were due to have their enlistments expire on December 31st. So his army was going to disappear 50%. Continental Army under Washington at this point because Congress had fled Philadelphia Militia wasn't turning out in big numbers in New Jersey or Pennsylvania many New Jersey ins Decided that well the American Army doesn't look like it's ever gonna fight and we're gonna take our chances and take loyalty oaths to the British and basically give Give up supporting the Americans Washington knew that his army was the embodiment of the cause of independence. It wasn't Congress. It wasn't some mythical the people. It wasn't the spirit of 76, but the revolution really was alive, not well, in his army. And he knew that he needed this chance because he had the men. There was an opportunity and to be frank, he was desperate. He had to do something here. And so when they crossed the Delaware on the night of Christmas, he decided to attack Trenton, which was a garrison town of Hessians, German auxiliaries that were fighting for the British. And the British high command, after they... They kicked Washington out of Northern New Jersey. made a very curious decision, which turned out to be a mistake. And they decided that it would be easier to, to feed, equip and, and house the British troops if they were spread out in small garrisons across New Jersey, right? Uh, they could take local supplies. They could stay at local buildings and barns and warehouses. The troops could fodder, you know, search for fodder for the horses. And it wouldn't be a huge concentration in one place where disease would run rampant, that kind of thing, right? So what could possibly go wrong? And that was a curious decision because the British commanders, Sir William Howe, the commander of the army, his subordinates, James Grant, these were experienced campaigners and they should have known better, but they saw Washington turn tail and run. across northern New Jersey. So what could the threat be? So the furthest garrison from New York was at the town of Trenton. And that was right on the Delaware River and Washington rec... And his subordinates. He had a lot of good aides and fellow lieutenants with him, generals with him that were competent. And they recognize that this isolated outpost would be an excellent place to surprise and attack. And without going into the details in the little time that we have, they were successful. They, they attacked, they captured the garrison and they brought themselves and their prisoners back across the Delaware river. Well, when he did that. There were two other contingents of militia that were supposed to cross the Delaware downstream. They didn't make it, but one of them did the next day. And some of the New Jersey militia started concentrating. Their commander sent a message to Washington saying, hey, get back here. We've got more troops here than we thought, and we can do some more damage. And so they wound up at Trenton again on January 2nd, the British advanced to try to attack Washington. They did attack Washington at Trenton behind defenses, couldn't dislodge him, and then they planned to attack him again the next day, but Washington and the Army slipped out in the middle of the night and marched all the way to Princeton. I'm estimating, I think it was 10, 12 miles. Attacked the British there at Trenton, at Princeton on the morning of January 3rd, 77. Defeated that British contingent. It included a a charge of Continentals personally led by Washington on horseback. And eventually they went up into Northern New Jersey in the mountains near Morristown and Somerset County. And one of the interesting things, if I may, to say about this is, while your question is legitimate about these were small battles, and I wondered that too, while I was doing the research and writing for this chapter, but when you come across the correspondence of the Hessian commanders in New Jersey, some of Howe's subordinates, staff officers on the British side, they were all very surprised. They were shocked by those two battles and Washington's victories. And in fact, it led Howe to believe that he didn't have enough troops. to be able to defeat the Americans in the field in 1777 when spring came and summer came. So it had a profound impact in British military thinking far beyond the numbers. Jonathan Thomas (19:12) They took the revolution more seriously than they had previously So Moving on you write about the mythology that has developed around Valley Forge What are some of the most persistent myths and how does the reality differ from the popular narrative and can you give some background on the state of things? When Valley Forge happened and why why it's so important? John Maass (19:16) Mm-hmm. Yeah. Sure, absolutely. So in 1777, Sir William Howe, still in command, took a large contingent of British and Hessians and artillery and cavalry by water from New York City into Chesapeake Bay, sailed up the Chesapeake to the highest point, meaning the northernmost point of the Chesapeake where he could land a large army, at the time was called head of Elk, Maryland. It's now called Elkton, Maryland. It's in that area right where... The Delaware line is right there and it's not far from Pennsylvania either. And so he advanced on Philadelphia from there to try to capture what in effect was the American capital. There was never any designated capital city during the war, but in effect, Philadelphia was it for a while. Washington had positioned some troops there. They fought 20 miles outside Philadelphia at the battle of Brandywine. In early September of 77, Washington was defeated. The British move into Philadelphia. October 4th of 77, Washington tries an attack on part of the British army. His army was initially successful that day, a German town, that's where it was. But through fog and confusion and inexperience, he had to call off the attack. A lot of maneuvering after that, but Washington finally decided to go into a winter encampment at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, 20 some miles west, northwest of Philadelphia on the Skoolkill River. And this is where the army spent its first real winter over. There was a winter in 76, 77, but most of the troops were dispersed. It wasn't as large an army, here there was anywhere from 15 to 18,000 men. And some of the mythology is that the men went in and all of a sudden here comes Baron von Steuben. He was an actual Baron. It's a little convoluted. See manager for details. Read the fine print. But yes, he was a Baron. And then he whipped the army into shape and they marched out this bright spanking new, well-clothed, well-equipped, well-fed, enthusiastic army, ready to take on the world, Washington born anew, that kind of thing. But it wasn't that, and yet it was a lot more than that. So let's start with, it wasn't that. Von Stuben, his value to the American army still in my opinion, inestimable. It was incredibly valuable. He had a lot of experience. He had served actually on Frederick the Great's staff in the seven years war in Europe. And he came and was commissioned the Inspector General of the Army. And we don't really have that in the Army as a military rank anymore. It's more of a civilian rank. civilian, almost all government departments have an inspector general and IG is what they call it. And they do in the military, but not in the sense that in 1777, 78, when the encampment was, that was somebody who was an aide to the commander-in-chief, Washington, and also responsible for training, the movements, the equipment of the men. and the well-being of the army. And that's what he did. And he spoke French and German, very little English, but he had translators. And in order to, how do you train 18,000 troops over winter when it's one person? Well, you don't. So what he did was he had an officer or two from every regiment form into a company that he trained personally with his aides. And those officers then, once they were trained, and this began about early March of 78, once they were trained, they went back to their regiments and trained them. And he also simplified things. So for example, for a British soldier to fire his musket with the musket on the shoulder, the sergeant would have to give something like 20-some commands. Present your fire lock. cock your fire lock, handle your cartridge, prime your pan, draw your rammer, ram down cartridge, return your rammer, you know, all these kinds of things. And von Stuben simplified that down to about nine commands. Another more definitive way of helping the American army is how do you get trained to move with formations like they were? And these formations had to stay in line and had to stay together. So imagine you're an officer, regimental lieutenant colonel in charge of the third Pennsylvania, and you're marching your troops along the road where there are four abreast and 25, 30 deep behind you in the file in the column there. You've got all these men on the road and you are commanded, okay, deploy your troops to the left and the right of the road and make ready for an attack. Well, what are the commands? And how do you do that? And more importantly, how do you get the men to do that? How do you train them? They have to do that. Movement on the battlefield was crucial. And that really paid off at the first battle after Valley Forge, which was Monmouth Courthouse. So, Vanchetumal was very valuable. Now, there was a tremendous problem in the army over the winter with illness and with a lack of food. Approximately 2,500 men died at the Valley Forge camps because of malnutrition disease and the cold exposure. And the problem really wasn't food that wasn't available. A lot of it had to do with the snow preventing the food from being transported to the camps. Also, the Valley Forge encampment was only 25 miles or so from Philadelphia. Farmers between Valley Forge and Pennsylvania, when faced with the choice of selling their crops and food to Washington's army, which would pay in paper continental currency, or the British who would buy it for hard currency, meaning coin and pounds and sterling, what have you. Well, who do you think the farmers were gonna sell their stuff to? They were gonna sell them to the British. And it was problems like that. It's one example that Washington had to fix. There was also a situation in the Valley Forge camp that's been studied quite a bit, most recently by Mark Lender, who wrote an excellent book called Cabal. And this situation was known as the Conway Cabal. And I won't go into the details, but I highly recommend Lender's book. Is that... Washington and some of his senior officers thought honestly that there was a small contingent of Continental officers and congressmen who opposed him, wanted him replaced, and were working behind the scenes to get that done. And what he was able to do was he was able to maneuver, some of it was luck, some of it was pure Washington's sang Freud. He was able to maneuver the opposing officers who were mostly hanging around Congress out of the army. And he also decided that the best way of fixing his supply problems and his food and transport and that was to work with Congress because he got wind that some Congressman thought that he was over-exaggerating the situation in Valley Forge and it really wasn't that bad and that he was manipulating them. So he invited a delegation of Congressman to come to Valley Forge and see for themselves. So this was the first Congressional Investigative Committee. of course, the way things go in America, it was the best one, right? And ever since then, it's gone downhill a lot. Not always, not always, but it was a brilliant political move, a brilliant political move. And once these congressmen came to the camps to see for themselves, and Washington and Alexander Hamilton, Nathaniel Green as quartermaster general, they worked with the congressman and the congressman saw what was going on. Jonathan Thomas (28:12) Ha John Maass (28:38) And another political move that he was very astute with is that prior to their arrival, he decided, well, I'm going to jump the gun and kind of decide which way the conversation is going to go. So he and Hamilton, mostly Hamilton, of course, but under his, Washington's name, they drew up a 16,000 word document for Congress to read on what they thought should be done. That instantly put everything in a framework and structure that Washington wanted. And that helped. So Washington emerged from Valley Forge without opposition from other army leaders, with a pretty good feeling between the army and Congress, and also much more confident in himself. And what I like to say, and I don't... overemphasize this in the book, but you know, when he was commissioned in June of 1775 by Congress, his commission states that his rank is general and commander in chief. And up until Valley Forge, he was definitely the general. And I think after that, he was also the commander in chief. There was no more threat to his command. No more serious threat to his command after that. And that's one of the key factors. Now, if I might, and maybe this isn't the best position for this, but to get to the argument that I do make at the end of the book, this is a great, great example. When the army marched out of Valley Forge, they chased the British who were marching from Philadelphia back to their New York headquarters. And Washington saw that as a great opportunity to strike the British column in the rear so that the maximum number of American troops could isolate and destroy part of the British army. And that was a good strategy, right? You're not risking everything against the entire, you're not risking fighting the entire British army in the field in an open battle. You're taking a limited risk. And the troops did well. They maneuvered well, the artillery was splendid in that battle. Everybody was able to move, they could communicate, they had to retreat somewhat to a protective position, but they weren't routed. And so was that a turning point in the war? Well, it was an important point and it did help give confidence to Washington's army, but Did it alter the trajectory of the war? Well, they attacked an army that was already moving from Philadelphia to New York. And did the British make it to New York? Yes. So they did not prevent the British from reaching their goal. They also did not win a spectacular victory in the field, despite what Washington and other American patriot-related newspapers had everyone believing. But what it did is it was a result of Valley Forge. The training and the discipline and the performance of the American Army at the Battle of Monmouth Courthouse is proof that Valley Forge was the turning point because that's what created that army that could do Jonathan Thomas (32:04) super, super fascinating stuff. Cause it's, you know, we've, we all grew up learning about Valley Forge and all that. So it's, it's interesting to, to get into the meat of it. So for my next question, you discuss in your book, how generals like British generals, like how and Clinton sometimes missed opportunities for decisive victory. What do you see as their key strategic mistakes as the war continued on? John Maass (32:30) Well, I would say that... the New York campaign from the summer of 76 through when Washington was ejected and his army was basically pushed out of the New York area prior to Trenton, which we talked to 10 minutes ago. How... The British Army, I don't know a good way to put it, they seemed, even after beating Washington's army in the field, and it was a victory for the British, no question about it, at Long Island, sometimes called the Battle of Brooklyn, they did not pursue their victory. were very, I should say that William Howe was very reluctant to give chase. And other officers at the time, particularly the Hessian officers, could not understand why when you had the enemy on the ropes, again, these were untrained rebels who most of the British officers treated with absolute contempt. The weather was good. Washington's men were pinned in their trenches at Brooklyn, and yet Howe did not go for the jugular. He seemed to be stuck in second gear. It allowed Washington to escape. And several other battles in that campaign in Manhattan, including Harlem Heights, Kips Bay, the British allowed the Americans to evacuate Manhattan when they were on the island themselves. Just a big missed out opportunity. And that's covered in a book by Joseph Ellis called Revolutionary Summer. And I go into a little detail where I think Ellis gets it very wrong by saying that was the last chance the British had to end the war. That's just untrue. I'll leave it at that. The British also had another opportunity when Washington was retreating across New Jersey. They had an opportunity to attack and cross the Raritan River. at Brunswick, New Jersey and they didn't. So Hal was very reluctant to push that. They also have a chapter on the Saratoga campaign. They were able to bring an army from Montreal all the way to Saratoga with 8,000 men. Howe had another contingent in New York City of well over 15,000 men, and yet they didn't concentrate them. They kept them separate to have one army coming from the north and one army coming north along the Hudson. If you've got that many men available, one of the principles of war is concentration of force, and they didn't. Rather, they made two separate centers of gravity, one coming from Canada, one coming maybe from New York. It turns out they didn't come from New York at all. No one came from New York until the very end. There were opportunities along those lines where they really could have had the knockout blow, but didn't. Jonathan Thomas (35:42) So what role did logistics and supply issues play in determining the outcome of these key battles? And how did the British fail at this? Is it the geographic distance that they failed at? mean... John Maass (35:55) So in a very, very simplistic way, the structure was that the war was being run out of London by Lord George Germain. He was the secretary of state for the Southern department or Southern colonies, which included all the American colonies, including the West Indies and also Canada. So there was a command out of Quebec and Montreal. There was a command out of New York sending correspondence and planning for that kind of those kinds of operations when on a good voyage, it took about four weeks to get correspondence from New York to London. on a good voyage from London back, it was a minimum of six weeks and many times letters either miscarried altogether or took 10 or 12 weeks. And you can't run an operation from London like that when your armies are on the ground. You have to have somebody in charge on the ground. And again, I talked about a split command. William Howe was in charge of He was the commander in chief of all British land forces in America, except Canada. And for some reason, Canada was a separate command under Sir Guy Carlton. And during the Saratoga campaign, not only that, but the effort coming from Canada, the British High Command in London decided, well, we're not going to have Carlton do that. We're going to send another Lieutenant General to do that. So... That was a divided command in Canada. Just being able to supply troops from either the British possessions in the West Indies and from England and Ireland just did not work. And I'll give an example to try to explain that. I have a chapter on the Saratoga campaign. So just imagine trying to... wage a campaign when the only communications really are going to be by ship, where you have one army marching south from the St. Lawrence River along Lake Champlain, then Lake George, then trying to get to the Hudson River to float down and march down to Albany. And between Montreal and Albany, there were very few towns, very few roads. It was a wilderness area for those folks who have been up in that area of Lake George and Lake Champlain and the Catskills and that area. No major roads in there. Transportation was by path and water, river, lakes. It was wilderness, not many farms, particularly west of Lake Champlain and Lake George. There were numerous problems getting carts to haul things, horses. Canada only had a population of about, I think this is right, in this period of time, the Canadian population was only about 70,000. So there weren't enough people to make the carts and haul the goods and be logistics workers, laborers. And they just didn't think it through. Lord North, who was the prime minister, Lord Germain running the war, Burgoyne. Well, North and Germain, they only had been They had never been to America. Burgoyne had been to America the year beforehand. They just did not know the scale of things. And so that had a big impact because it led to delays that where Burgoyne trying to reach Albany with an army of 8,000 men, he was forced to conduct smaller operations to try to get supplies and they weren't working. it impacted the fact that he eventually had to surrender because he was under supply. Jonathan Thomas (40:05) Now, skipping ahead on my questions a little bit, how important was the French naval contribution to this ultimate victory? Would the outcome at Yorktown have been possible without the French Navy? What role did they play? John Maass (40:22) Well, I don't think the outcome would have been favorable if there was no French intervention at all, period, end of story. So the importance of Saratoga, which is the of the five key turning points that I suggest and identify, that's the most important. At Saratoga, the British had to surrender Burgoyne's army. was 8,000 men. It ended... any kind of chance of success in that Frontier campaign. All those troops were gone. Cannons captured, wagons wrecked. When news of that victory, and that was in October, October 17th, 1777, news of that victory reached Paris and Versailles in early December. And by that, when that news came, all of a sudden, the French minister of Vigens and even the King, Louis XVI, all of a sudden were interested in talking now and supplying the Americans overtly rather than covertly with uniforms, equipment, artillery, money, muskets, things like that. And so they... The two American representatives in France, by the way, was Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane. The Americans and the French signed a Treaty of Amity in Commerce, but they also signed a military alliance. When that word reached London officially, that was the equivalent of a declaration of war from France on the British because The French were now recognizing the quote American rebels as American citizens because, they have a new country. Look at that cute, nice little country. We're going to support them. And that's what they did. And the main contribution, as you asked in your question, you started on your question, is the Alliance gave the Americans something that they did not have and would never have. at any point during the revolution, which is a Navy. And all of a sudden the British had, they had an opponent in American waters in the West Indies. And now the British couldn't necessarily ship their supplies and men into New York and Canada, excuse me, the Chesapeake Bay or Charleston later on. They couldn't move troops from. one place to another and surprised the Americans like they tried to in the Brandywine campaign, Philadelphia campaign, excuse me. So there was now a French Navy that was very powerful and very well-officered and manned and trained. The other immediate impact was, and this is... often mentioned in overviews the American Revolution, but I think it needs to be stressed even more and empirically if possible, is that once the British and the French were at war, all of a sudden the main theater of the conflict was no longer the 13 colonies that we all love today in America. The instant change was the paramount importance of the Sugar Islands in the West Indies because they were incredibly valuable to the British and the French and both worried that each other was going to attack the Sugar Islands of the other, capture them, cripple the France or Britain economically. And so I remember when I mentioned that the Battle of Monmouth in 78 occurred because the British were moving from Philadelphia back to New York. Well, the reason why they were moving from Philadelphia back to New York is because the new commander in chief of the British in America, Sir Henry Clinton, was ordered to send thousands of redcoats down to the West Indies from New York to protect the British islands. And so there were never going to be much more reinforcements coming to the 13 colonies so long as the West Indies was now the Paramount, the main, what they used to call in the 18th century, the seat of war, the place where the war was the most important. And fast forward into Yorktown, really the most important moment in the entire Yorktown campaign, which was basically from August through October of 1781, was the British and French naval battle off the coast of the mouth of the Chesapeake called the Battle of the Capes on September 5th, 1781. It was the most important battle of the campaign, arguably the most important naval battle in early American history. And not a single American was involved in it. It was British Navy versus French Navy. And when the French basically defeated the British off the mouth of the Chesapeake, they were able to block the entrance to the Chesapeake, which meant no more British could get in, but it also meant that Cornwallis's big, fat, juicy, 8,000 or 7,000 man army at Yorktown could not get out. And that really was the moment that naval battle was the moment where it looked like that was gonna be it. Jonathan Thomas (46:01) So wrapping up this discussion, what would you say were the biggest strategic mistakes that the British made that... just giving up, essentially. John Maass (46:13) Well... I already mentioned the Saratoga and Philadelphia campaigns were fought at the same time. The divided armies, the divided command, no one in charge of everything. these, it was a strategic mistake because this was basically from the Philadelphia area all the way to Northern New York. This sprawling theater, including New York City, Western New York State. They did not concentrate their forces. They split them up into two field forces and a New York Harrison. And that was a big mistake. No one was in command of the whole thing, which means no one is really in command of anything. That was big. I think maybe before then, this was, know, hindsight's 20-20. that's, know, historians are great at predicting. what happened in the past. At some point earlier on in the war, they should have been willing to have a really serious conversation among rational people. on whether or not to fight the war or give in to American demands or just say, okay, let's figure this out. Especially after Lexington and Concord where they lost hundreds and hundreds of men to rabble farmers who had a musket and 20 rounds and no, no, no. well, some of did, but not a lot of combat experience in last 20 years. And at Bunker Hill, which was technically a British victory, but they lost a thousand men, including way too many officers. And the British were shocked that the Americans would stand behind defenses while British grenadiers and light infantry companies were advancing up the hill, bayonets fixed. This wasn't going to be a pushover. The Americans were able to push the British out of Boston by threatening to bombard the town and the fleet. The British should have taken stock at this point that it wasn't going to be... It was a rebellion and that's important to remember. But it wasn't going to be like a rebellion like the 1745 rebellion in Scotland where they could march, literally march troops into Scotland, right? And they could land supplies in Scottish ports and that kind of thing to put down the rebellion. Or it wasn't like the fighting that they were accustomed to in Ireland, which is also very close by. America was 3000 miles away and... really someone should have said, and people did, members of parliament did, and many people were not in favor of this war at all right from the beginning, but they missed the chance by trying to say, okay, what is it that you want, which everybody knew what they wanted, and we will concede these things, and we will eventually concede these things, and to to work it out. Because in the end, what did they get? In one way, at the end of the war, they still dominated American trade. Even before the treaty was signed in Paris in 1783, British ships were coming into American ports for commerce. They didn't lose American commerce as a result of the war. They lost a hell of a lot of money. They lost a lot of people, a lot of men. Spent eight years doing it. And it was a mistake not to negotiate earlier. They did try to negotiate in 1776 before the Battle of Long Island. But... By the time the British arrived in force in New York City, the Declaration of Independence had already been signed and proclaimed. It was too late. Jonathan Thomas (50:19) All they had to do was give us seats in parliament and all could have been avoided. John Maass (50:24) Well, you know what? Yes and no. That is probably another book for somebody else to write. But in some ways, I think the last thing the Americans really wanted was parliamentary seats. Because then the parliament can say, OK, you've got your seats. We outvote you now in everything. So, yeah. Jonathan Thomas (50:36) You Yeah, then you run the risk of being treated like Ireland got treated where they were part of the parliament, but yet they were still a smaller minority and still got mistreated unless they were politically useful. So finally, from my last question, this is the fun question. Well, mean, all this has been fun, this is, what are your favorite British figures from this era that you greatly admire? John Maass (50:47) Yeah. A minority block, Okay. You I Jonathan Thomas (51:10) That stumped you, that's a tough one. John Maass (51:12) I would probably say Lord Cornwallis. And I think that's probably those skewed in my opinion because I've read all of his correspondence from 1780 to 1781. And I feel like he comes through very clearly in his correspondence to other officers back to London. He's easy to get to know because of his correspondence, very personal. You can tell his style. The others had some deep flaws. Burgoyne tried to kind of get out of the position he put himself in in Saratoga. William Howe was a weak figure. I don't know if you know much about Sir Henry Clinton, but he had a lot of emotional problems that he had difficulty, personality problems, let's put it that way. I think it's easy, and I'm not just saying that because I'm an American, but I think it's easy, I think there's a lot more admirable figures on the American side than there are on the British side. Jonathan Thomas (52:25) Spicy All right. Well, thank you so much for joining us on the Angletopia podcast John His book is from Trenton to Yorktown the five decisive turning points the American Revolution It's available now from Oscar publishing and wherever books are sold For links to purchase and to learn more about the author's research We will put all the links in the show notes and if you enjoyed today's discussion John Maass (52:31) Thank you. Jonathan Thomas (52:51) Please subscribe and leave a comment and join us next time as we continue exploring pivotal moments that shape British and American history. Thank you, John. John Maass (52:58) Thank you very much. Thanks for having me.